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We consider a very general class of theories, process theories, which capture the underlying structure
common to most theories of physics as we understand them today (be they established, toy or
speculative theories). Amongst these theories, we focus on those which are causal, in the sense that
they are intrinsically compatible with the causal structure of space-time as required by relativity.
We demonstrate that there is a sharp contrast between these theories and the corresponding time-
reversed theories, in which time is taken to flow backwards from the future to the past. While
the former typically feature a rich gamut of allowed states, the latter only allow for a single state:
eternal noise. We illustrate this result by considering the time-reverse of quantum theory. Moreover,
we derive a strengthening of the result in PRL 108, 200403 on signalling in time-reversed theories.
The question of whether theories of physics should be
formulated in a time-symmetric fashion has received a
lot of attention in the past few years [1–6], because of
its deep foundational implications and the pivotal role
it plays in the relationship between quantum theory and
general relativity. In this work, we show that if a theory
obeys the requirements imposed by relativistic principles
then the time-reverse of the theory is necessarily reduced
to a trivial state of eternal noise. This paints a provoca-
tive picture, in which time-symmetry breaks down in the
most extreme manner imaginable, but is the natural con-
sequence of taking general relativity seriously and apply-
ing its constraints to the letter.
The assumption that nature is time-symmetric arises
from taking reversible dynamics as the primary object of
importance for a theory. In contrast, we choose to work
within the framework of process theories [7, 8], which
forces one to treat all processes – including states, ef-
fects and general transformations – on an equal footing
with reversible dynamics. Our main result is then an im-
mediate consequence of compatibility of processes with
relativistic constraints.
PROCESS THEORIES
A process theory is comprised of a collection of systems,
graphically represented by wires, and processes, graphi-
cally represented by boxes with wires as their inputs (at
the bottom) and outputs (at the top). Special cases of
processes include: states, which are processes with no in-
puts; effects, which are processes with no outputs; num-
bers, which are processes with neither input nor output.
Processes can be wired together in order to form diagrams
(a.k.a. circuits) such as in (1) below. Note that, further to
assigning a meaning to wires and boxes, a process theory
should explicitly specify what it means to form diagrams;
in particular, every diagram must itself correspond to a
process in the theory. In the case of diagram (1), this is
a process with input A and output ABC, i.e. a composite
system. In algebraic terms, process theories are (strict)
symmetric monoidal categories [9].
Recall that we adopted a convention whereby process
inputs are drawn at the bottom, and process outputs are
drawn at the top. When drawing diagrams, this means
that the upward vertical direction is associated with time
flowing forward:
g
A
f h
B C
A
D
A
t (1)
The rather general formulation of process theories has
helped to solve a number of concrete problems in quan-
tum foundations and quantum computation. In quantum
foundations, for example, it has provided a complete and
consistent formulation of Spekkens’ toy theory, and pin-
pointed its key differences from quantum theory [10, 11].
In quantum computation, it has resulted in the deriva-
tion of exact correspondences between quantum compu-
tational models [12–14] and error-correction [15, 16].
One important thing to remark about process theories
is that the diagrams capture all there is to know about
the theory. This includes all relevant systems are repre-
sented explicitly in the diagrams e.g. also those carrying
information about measurement outcomes and classical
control in the case of quantum theory. This is in con-
trast to other ‘hybrid’ formalisms, such as [17–19], where
classical systems are represented implicitly by means of
indices and labels.
2One example of a process theory is probability the-
ory (a.k.a. classical theory), with probability distribu-
tions as states and stochastic maps as processes. An-
other interesting example is given by quantum theory:
processes include classical processes between classical
systems, quantum processes between quantum systems
(i.e. CPTP maps), as well as mixed classical-quantum
processes (e.g. preparations, measurements, instruments,
controlled unitaries, etc.) [8]. Many other physical the-
ories of interest can be formulated as process theories,
even though they traditionally might not be. General
relativity and quantum field theory, in particular, tend to
take a “block-universe” approach (following Minkowski),
as opposed to the “compositional” approach of process
theories. However, recent work [20, 21] has provided ini-
tial evidence that those theories can be reformulated in
a suitably compositional way, and be turned into process
theories.
PROCESS TERMINALITY
Our starting point is the following principle, underpin-
ning general scientific practice: the description of reality
here and now cannot depend on things happening too
far away in space, or in the future. In general relativ-
ity, this principle manifests itself as the causal structure
of space-time. From the point of view of process theo-
ries, this means that there should be a way of discarding
those systems which don’t affect our local description of
reality, compatibly with the constraints imposed by rela-
tivity. Implementing this prescription can be achieved by
providing a designated discarding effect for each system
in the theory:
A special case of the discarding effect appears when there
is nothing to actually discard e.g. at the output of an ef-
fect. In that case, the discarding effect is simply denoted
by an empty diagram:
f
In order for discarding effects to accurately model the
idea that a system has been discarded, the processes in
the theory have to obey the following constraint: discard-
ing all outputs after a process f has occurred is equiva-
lent to discarding all inputs beforehand; either way the
system ends up discarded. Formally, the constraint is
expressed by the following definition.
Definition 1. A process f is terminal if it satisfies:
f = (2)
and a process theory is terminal if all its processes are.
Note that from this formal definition it clearly follows
that we mean ‘truly discarding’, i.e. the process did not
“stash away” any of its input, as there are no outputs,
and diagrams are all there is to know about the theory.
Within the more restricted context of Operational Prob-
abilistic Theories [19], Definition 1 corresponds to the
principle of ‘no signalling from the future’, which was in-
troduced as a postulate in [19] and shown to be equivalent
to uniqueness of deterministic effects.
The special of equation (2) where f is an effect im-
mediately implies that the only effects are the discarding
ones themselves:
f = =f (3)
In the case of probability theory, discarding effects are
row vectors with all entries equal to 1, and in particular
the empty diagram is the number 1 itself. Discarding
a state in classical probability theory (a column vector
with non-negative real components) amounts to produc-
ing a number equal to the sum of its components: hence
a terminal state is one with components summing to 1,
i.e. a probability distribution. More generally, discarding
a process (a matrix with non-negative real components)
amounts to producing a row vector equal to the sum of
its rows: hence a terminal process is a matrix with en-
tries of each column summing up to 1, i.e. a stochastic
matrix. In the case of quantum theory, the discarding
effect for a quantum system is the process of taking the
(partial) trace of the system: hence terminal states are
unit-trace density matrices, and terminal processes are
trace-preserving CP maps.
It has been shown [19, 22] that equation (2) allows
one to derive the “no-signalling” principle, showcasing a
close connection between the notion of terminality and
relativity theory. A much stronger result was obtained
in [23], where it was shown that the very existence of
relativistic causal structure is equivalent to terminality
of a process theory.
Theorem 2 ([23]). A process theory is causal—in the
sense of general relativity—if and only if it is terminal.
The importance of this result to the understanding of
physics stems from the the different mathematical stand-
ing of causal structure and process terminality. Tradi-
tionally, causal structure is defined by a partial order-
ing between events [24–26], with the interpretation that
3event a can affect event b if and only if a ≤ b. Under
this definition, causal structure is not intrinsic to a pro-
cess theory, instead having to be imposed on top of it. By
passing to process terminality, relativistic constraints are
directly incorporated into the process theory, which be-
comes a full-fledged, stand-alone description of physical
reality.
MAIN RESULT
A major advantage of the process-theoretic format is the
canonical manner in which time-reversal arises, even in
absence of a time parameter t: it is simply obtained by in-
verting the temporal reading order of the diagrams, turn-
ing our bottom-to-top convention into a top-to-bottom
one without altering the diagrams themselves:
g
A
f h
B C
A
D
A
t 7→
g
A
f h
B C
A
D
A
t
Alternatively, we can retain our bottom-to-top reading
convention, and flip the diagrams themselves upside-
down, obtaining the corresponding time-reversed dia-
grams :
g
A
f h
B C
A
D
A
t 7→
g
A
f h
B C
A
D
A
t
Notably, our definition of time-reversal does not include
a specification of what time-reversing a box actually
means: the reason for this is that such specifics are of
no importance to our main result, which applies to any
notion of time-reversal which respects the structure of
diagrams. In the special case where the original process
theory is causal, we refer to its time-reverse as a retro-
causal process theory.
Theorem 3 (Eternal noise). In a retro-causal process
theory every system has a unique state, namely the time-
reversal of the discarding effect:
(4)
Proof. By flipping the process terminality condition of
equation (2) upside-down we obtain the following equa-
tion, holding for every process f in the time-reverse of
the theory:
f =
In the special case where the process f is chosen to be a
state, we have that the process f in the original theory
must necessarily be an effect. But f has to be termi-
nal, i.e. it must be the discarding effect itself, and hence
f
is always necessarily equal to the time-reverse of the
discarding effect (we have used the fact that the time-
reversal of the empty diagram is again the empty dia-
gram). This concludes our proof.
A system with a single state cannot possibly carry any
information, so we can naturally interpret this state as
(white) noise. Taking the standard notion of time rever-
sal within quantum and classical theory (as provided by
the Hermitian adjoint and transpose respectively [8]), we
find that this is explicitly the case. Hence the result of
Theorem 3 can be restated as follows: any retro-causal
process theory is necessarily in a state of eternal (white)
noise.
EXAMPLE: TIME-REVERSING QUANTUM
THEORY
To illustrate the extremely general result from the pre-
vious section, we will now consider the concrete example
of quantum theory. Quantum theory is captured by a
process theory in which systems correspond to finite di-
mensional Hilbert spaces, and processes to CPTP maps
between them. Typically time-reversal is described by
the Hermitian Adjoint, which respects the structure of
diagram as required by our assumptions [7, 8].
If we consider reversible dynamics for a quantum sys-
tem, i.e. a unitary U , then the corresponding retro-causal
process is
U
= U †. Thise is clearly a suitable choice of
time-reversed process, since it ‘undoes’ the evolution of
the quantum system as expected:
U
=
U
Note that any unitary will belong to both the causal and
retro-causal theory: this follows from the fact that the
time-reverse of the discarding effect is proportional to the
maximally mixed state, and it means that unitaries are
unital CPTP maps. Because unitaries belong to both,
we must go beyond reversible dynamics to observe the
distinction between the causal and retro-causal theories.
Specifically, we will consider measurements, i.e. physical
interactions between quantum and classical systems. In
4order to readily distinguish between classical and quan-
tum systems, we will adopt the graphical convention of
[8], by which quantum systems are denoted by thick wires
and classical systems are denoted by thin wires. For ex-
ample, a non-demolition measurement associated with
a quantum observable—a complete family (Px)x∈X of
orthogonal projectors on a quantum system—is a pro-
cess with quantum input and quantum-classical output:
it takes a quantum state, non-deterministically applies
a projector Px form the observable to it, and returns
the projected state in output, together with the classi-
cal label x ∈ X identifying the projector that has been
applied. In the diagrammatic style of [8, 27], one such
non-demolition measurement takes the following form:
=
∑
x∈X
Px x (5)
The corresponding demolition measurement is the pro-
cess which is obtained by discarding the quantum output:
=
∑
x∈X
Px x:= (6)
The demolition measurement is a quantum-to-classical
process. Applied to a density matrix ρ it results in a
probability distribution P[x ∈ X ] on the set X indexing
the projectors:
P[x ∈ X ] = Tr (Pxρ)
The time-reverse of the non-demolition measurement
from equation 5 is the following process:
=
∑
x∈X
Px x (7)
The classical outcome is now classical control, and picks
out a choice of projector to be applied to the quantum
system. Similarly, the time-reverse of the demolition
measurement from equation (6) is now a classically con-
trolled preparation of quantum states:
=
∑
x∈X
Px x:= (8)
In a retro-causal theory, however, the only classical state
available to control these projector-selection and state-
preparation processes is the uniform probability distri-
bution over controlling states. As a consequence, all we
can achieve by classical control in time-reversed quantum
theory is decoherence in an observable and preparation
of the totally mixed state:
=
∑
x∈X
Px = (9)
This observation resolves an apparent contradiction be-
tween this work and the result in [2] stating that the
time-reverse of classical probability theory is a signalling
theory: in principle, the retro-causal classical theory does
admit signalling processes, but there is no information to
actually signal, only eternal noise. One might therefore
be tempted to ask: what happens if we de-couple clas-
sical agents from the theory that we reverse, and retain
their normal abilities?
NO-GO: RETAINING AN AGENT’S CONTROL
A process theoretic perspective highlights how de-
coupling classical agents from the physical theory is a
somewhat odd thing to do: if everything else is modelled
explicitly, there is no real reason to believe that agents
should not. In other approaches this may appear less
odd, but it is only because agents held an external posi-
tion in the first place. Thus said, de-coupling agents from
the theory does not solve our problems: as it turns out,
the agent would still be able to superluminally signal.
Indeed, all they have to do is apply the time-reverse of
a non-demolition Bell measurement to deterministically
realize the projector on the Bell state (where we have ex-
ploited the Choi isomorphism to represent all Bell-basis
projectors in terms of the Bell state):
=
∑
x
Ux
U †x
x
0‘pre-selection
This in turn result in the possibility of performing deter-
ministic quantum teleportation [28]:
=
Because the agent is now in possession of states other
than noise, deterministic quantum teleportation immedi-
ately leads to a violation of no-signalling. For example,
they could use the time-reverse of the demolition Pauli
Z measurement to selectively prepare computation basis
states, which they would then deterministically teleport:
x
=
x
for x ∈ {0, 1}
5We conclude that retaining an agent’s full classical con-
trol does nothing to help restore time-symmetry: the
original causal theory is non-signalling, while the retro-
causal theory is signalling, so the symmetry is broken.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The physical interpretation of our main result depends
on a choice of ontological stance on states and processes.
In modern physics, the standard assumption is that the
state of a physical system describes its actual “state of af-
fairs”, evolved and studied by solving appropriate sets of
equations: for example, the ontic state of a physical sys-
tem in classical Hamiltonian mechanics is fully described
by a considering a point in its phase space, and can be
evolved in time by solving Hamilton’s Equations. In this
sense, a retro-causal process theory is truly eternal noise,
and hence utterly trivial.
One could consider the alternative, long-standing view-
point that it is processes, rather than states, that fully
characterize the “state of affairs” of physical systems: it
is becoming that matters, rather than being [29, 30]. In
this case, the retro-causal theory is no longer trivial, as
it ends up having as many processes as the causal theory
originally had. It would therefore be tempting to con-
clude that a causal process theory and its time-reverse
have the same “informational content”, with the only
distinction that inputs and outputs have exchanged roles
[3]. However, these two process theories are not at all
equivalent: the processes that can be applied to a partic-
ular system will be different for the two theories, and in
particular the states never coincide!
The results we present here seem to be in conflict with
recent time-symmetric approaches to quantum theory,
such as those by [1, 4, 5]. The resolution of this apparent
conflict lies in the observation that those time-symmetric
theories are not terminal in their most general formu-
lation: they are not a priori compatible with relativ-
ity, at least not in the compositional, process-theoretic
sense laid out by [23]. Instead, asymmetric boundary
conditions must be imposed to ensure compatibility with
causal structure (e.g. to forbid superluminal signalling).
It was shown in [4] that suitable boundary conditions and
dynamics can be chosen so that process terminality is re-
covered: in that case, the results of the time-symmetric
framework coincide with those presented in this work. To
us, however, this entire setup seems unnecessarily com-
plicated: after all, relativistic principles do not make any
obvious statements about the boundary conditions of the
universe. In contrast, the terminality condition that we
impose is directly related to the causal structure of rela-
tivity, and as such we deem it to be a far more natural
constraint.
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